Badaber attack
MORE than a dozen attackers, some 30 dead, over two dozen the militant attack on a Pakistan Air Force camp in Badaber, Peshawar was a highly orchestrated strike with deadly effects.
Army captain among 29 -claimed assault in Peshawar on PAF camp
To start with, while the Badaber place is thickly populated and is close to the tribal region, it’s also a sensitive place where previous strikes, including those on airplanes landing in the Peshawar airport, happen to be started from.
Certainly, for over a dozen armed militants traveling through the Badaber region to disguise themselves as security staff and arrive undetected in the entry is a security failure of some level.
In addition, it has been asserted that there were intelligence reports of a potential strike in the region — who subsequently was responsible for neglecting to tighten security promptly and sufficiently enough?
Subsequently, there was the quite amazing contest involving the ISPR Muhammad Khurasani, as well as the Taliban representative, to shape the story of the assault instantly.
The restricted TTP was apparently live blogging it while the ISPR was tweeting the military’s answer to the strike — journalists from Khurasani received continued messages giving an obviously one sided however blow by blow accounts of what was supposedly happening in the PAF camp.
The fundamental question then, how were the militants in a position to make use of uninterrupted lines of communication to communicate between themselves and, second, to talk to the media?
Even in the event the order center was in Afghanistan — though this has not yet been established — it’s troubling the TTP continues to have such untroubled and direct use of connections.
Moreover, given the amount of attackers, there was definitely some sort of communicating in the run up to the strike involving the coordinators as well as the perpetrators.
When there’s a possible solution, the physical as well as technical constraints needs to be clarified to people.
It’s upsetting that his counterpart in other militant groups or the TTP spokesman may continue to run communications.
While the provincial authorities leaders as well as the KP authorities supply regular updates about alleged terror suspects and various raids made, it stays pretty clear the desired degree of coordination and co-operation between the military and civilian arms of the security equipment isn’t there. Will anyone indicate immediate fixes and explain why?
